Abstract. The problem of reliably transferring data from a set of NP producers to a set of NC consumers in the BAR model, named N-party BAR Transfer (NBART), is an important building block for volunteer computing systems. An algorithm to solve this problem in synchronous systems, which provides a Nash equilibrium, has been presented in previous work. In this paper, we propose an NBART algorithm for asynchronous systems. Furthermore, we also address the possibility of collusion among the Rational processes. Our game theoretic analysis shows that the proposed algorithm tolerates certain degree of arbitrary collusion, while still fulfilling the NBART properties.
Introduction
Peer-to-peer networks can be used for executing computationally intensive projects, as shown by the Boinc infrastructure [1] . Building systems on this kind of networks may be quite challenging due to the existence of Byzantine processes, whose behaviour is arbitrary, and of Rational processes, which may deviate from the specified protocols if they can increase their utility. A system model that captures this variety of behaviours has been coined the BAR model [2] , named after the three classes of processes (Byzantine, Altruistic, and Rational) that it explicitly considers.
Our work focuses on the particular problem of reliably transferring data from a set of N P producers to a set of N C consumers in the BAR model, named N-party BAR Transfer (NBART). This problem is an important building block for volunteer computing systems, since it allows volunteers to transfer intermediate or final results of the computations to another set of volunteers, after storing the data for some time. For instance, if computations are to be performed using a model such as MapReduce, mappers may invoke the NBART primitive to transfer the intermediate results to reducers.
Although an algorithm that solves this problem has already been devised for synchronous systems [3] , in a peer-to-peer network it is often unrealistic to assume that there is a known upper bound for the execution time and the communication delay. With this in mind, this paper addresses the NBART problem in an asynchronous system. Furthermore, this paper also addresses the problem of collusion, which is a real issue in peerto-peer networks due to attacks, such as sybil and white washing. In addition to arbitrary collusion of Byzantine players, we consider that Rational processes may create collusion groups, including producers and consumers.
Related Work Since models based on traditional Game Theory assume that all processes follow the selfish strategy that maximises their utility function, they fail to account for arbitrary behaviour that may arise from Byzantine faults. In face of this limitation, traditional utility functions must be augmented to accommodate Byzantine-awareness. Additionally, alternative rules for predicting how the game will be played have also been proposed to address Byzantine behaviour.
To the best of our knowledge, the work of Eliaz et. al. [4] was the first to address the issues above, introducing the notion of k-Fault Tolerant Nash Equilibrium (k-FTNE). In this context, a profile of strategies is k-FTNE if the strategy of each player is a best response to the strategy of other players, independently of the identity of Byzantine players and the arbitrary strategy they Contributions The first contribution of this paper consists in an algorithm that solves NBART in asynchronous systems. We show that the proposed algorithm is correct, assuming that all nonByzantine processes follow it, for N P ≥ 2F P + 1 and N C ≥ F C + 1, where F P and F C are upper bounds on the number of Byzantine producers and Byzantine consumers respectively. We also show that the presented algorithm obtains asymptotically optimal bit complexity in certain scenarios.
The second contribution consists in the game theoretic analysis of the proposed algorithm. Since processes incur communication costs, our algorithm cannot be (k, t)-robust [11] , hence we rely on a weaker notion of Byzantine aware utility function to account for Byzantine behaviour, based on the notion proposed in [11] .
Given that we cannot ensure that the players within a coalition follow the algorithm, we propose a new solution concept, which is an adaptation of k-resilience to account for collusion in the following way. We define an equilibrium as a profile of strategies σ where members of a coalition are interested in deviating from σ only if their behaviour, as observed by other processes, is equivalent to σ.
We assume that the size of each group of Rational colluding processes is bounded by a constant N T = N P T +N C T , where N P T is the number of members of the colluding group that are producers and N C T is the number of consumers on the same group. We show that, if N P ≥ max(F P , N P T ) + F P + 1 and N C ≥ F C + N C T + 1, then the algorithm provides such equilibrium, implying that processes from any coalition follow a strategy that ensures that the NBART properties are fulfilled. An important consequence of this is that, in the absence of collusion, the algorithm provides a Nash equilibrium.
Paper Organisation The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The system model and the NBART problem are defined in Section 2. The algorithm that solves NBART in the given model is presented in Section 3, along with the proofs of correctness and a simple complexity analysis. In Section 4, we perform the game theoretic analysis of the algorithm.
System Model
We assume an asynchronous system composed of N processes or players (we will use the term player only when performing the Game Theoretic analysis; in any other case, we will use the name process). Processes are connected by a fully-connected network and can communicate using reliable authenticated point-to-point communication channels [16] .
We make the distinction between identity, process/player, and coalition. An identity is a tuple (i, pk i , sk i ), where i is an identifier and pk i and sk i are the corresponding public and private keys. There is a set of identities I = P ∪C, where P and C are the sets of producer and consumer identities, respectively, such that #P = N P and #C = N C . Players are the decision-making entities of our Game Theoretic analysis and are represented by a single identity. Therefore, when referring to the process that holds the identity (i, pk i , sk i ), we will simply refer to it as i. If i ∈ P, the corresponding process is referred to as a producer, otherwise, it is called a consumer. Finally, N P + N C = N .
As defined by the BAR model, a player can be Altruistic (if it follows the algorithm), Byzantine (if its behaviour is arbitrary), or Rational (if it follows the strategy that maximises its utility given the expectations regarding the strategies followed by other players). We assume that Rational processes adhere to the promptness principle [2] , in the sense that if the expected utilities of following the algorithm and deviating by delaying messages are equivalent, then processes do not deviate. It is said that a player i signs information with sk i by invoking s i (data).
NBART Problem
The NBART Problem can be defined as follows. Each producer p produces an arbitrarily large value v p by invoking the deterministic function produce(p, v p ), such that any two non-Byzantine producers produce the same value, named the correct value. Consumers must consume only one value v, sent by some producer, by invoking consume(c, v). The invocation of this primitive proves that, indeed, c consumes the value. To deal with Rational behaviour, we rely on the participation of an abstract entity named Trusted Observer (TO), whose function is to gather cryptographic information from the participants of each transfer and reward processes according to their observable behaviour. To assess the behaviour of each process, TO uses two predicates hasProd(evidence, p) and hasAck (evidence, c) that take as input the evidence produced by TO to indicate, respectively, if producer p participated in NBART and if consumer c notified the reception of the correct value. TO is said to eventually produce evidence about the transfer if, when hasProd and hasAck become true for all corresponding non-Byzantine producers and consumers, TO eventually calls the primitive certify(TO, evidence) after that. With these definitions, the NBART problem is characterised by the following properties: -NBART 6 (Producer Certification): If producer p is non-Byzantine, then hasProd(evidence, p) eventually becomes true. -NBART 7 (Consumer Certification): If consumer c is non-Byzantine, then hasAck(evidence, c) eventually becomes true.
Asynchronous NBART
We now describe an algorithm that solves the NBART problem in an asynchronous environment. We first provide an overview, then proceed to the detailed description of the algorithm, and we conclude with a theoretical analysis, where we prove the correctness of this solution and perform a complexity analysis in terms of message and bit complexity.
Overview of the Algorithm
The algorithm can be briefly described as follows. Each producer p owns a block (b p ) that belongs to the set of N P blocks obtained from the value v by using Reed-Solomon codes, such that v can be retrieved from any subset of B blocks (N P ≥ B + F P ). Then, p strives to transfer b p along with the signature of the vector that contains the hashes of all blocks to a subset of consumers denoted by conset p . Each consumer c only needs to receive B correct blocks and F P + 1 signatures of the same vector of hashes to consume the value. However, c must continue to process any received information and send it to TO, which must (re-)invoke certify(evidence) whenever it receives new information, in order to fulfil the property NBART-5.
Algorithm in Depth
The algorithm is depicted for producers in Alg. 1, for consumers in Alg. 2 and Alg. 3, and for TO in Alg. 4. Producers use Reed-Solomon codes to reduce the communication costs of transferring an arbitrarily large value. The value v, whose length in bits is denoted by l v , is split into N P blocks of size lv B , such that any subset of B blocks is sufficient to retrieve the original value, where 1 ≤ B ≤ N P − F P and B < l v . There is a function RS-ENC(v, N P , B, ω) that, given the correct value v, the number of producers N P , the number of blocks B, and the word size ω, returns a vector v containing the N P blocks, where 2 ω > N P . Let h v denote the vector containing the hashes of each of the blocks from v. The inverse function RS-DEC (v ′ , N P , B, ω, h v ) is defined as follows: if there are at least B blocks from v ′ whose hash is in h v , then it returns the value v; otherwise, it returns ⊥. We consider that all arithmetic operations are performed over elements of the Galois Field GF (2 ω ).
We consider that each process is unequivocally identified by an index, between 0 and N P − 1 for producers, and between 0 and N C −1 for consumers. Each consumer c j uses a deterministic function prodset c j to determine the set of producers that are supposed to send it their blocks, defined in such a way that each consumer is related to exactly B + F P producers (in this way distributing load among producers). A possible mapping function is the following:
It is useful to define the function that establishes the inverse relation conset p i = {c j ∈ C|p i ∈ prodset c j } for each producer p i . These definitions ensure that each consumer is able to receive at least B blocks from non-Byzantine producers, therefore being able to retrieve the correct value. In addition, the load is distributed across the producers such that ∀ p∈P :
Each producer p starts by storing the set of blocks from v by invoking RS-ENC. Note that each producer will only be required to transmit one of these blocks (each producer transmits a different block). However, each producer is still required to send h v . Therefore, each producer then sets the vector hashes to h v (Alg. 1, lines 4-7). Then, p transfers its block along with h v to all consumers of conset p in a Block message (lines 8-10), while sending Summary messages to the remaining consumers only containing h v (lines [11] [12] [13] . Both these messages are signed with the public key of the producer. Notice that, in the Block message, it is not necessary to sign the block, for the signature of the hashes already authenticates the block. In turn, each consumer c keeps all the received data blocks in a vector blocks and the received vectors of hashes (along with the signatures) in hashvecs. In addition, there is a set missing that keeps the identities of the producers that have not yet sent any signed information. Finally, correcthashvec is the correct vector of hashes, that is, the vector that is sent by at least F P + 1 producers, and correctproducers stores, for each producer, the value ⊥ if it has not yet sent any message, or the signature of the message sent by the producer.
Each consumer uses the functions verifysig(i,d) and verifyhash(b,h) to verify the signature by i of d and the hash of b when compared to h, respectively. Consumer c is in one of three states: init, gotHashes, and consumed. c is in state init when hashvecs does not contain a majority (F P + 1) of identical vectors of hashes. The function minimumHashes (Alg. 2, lines 8-12) marks the transition between init and gotHashes, by setting correcthashvec to a non-null value, when the required majority of hashes is gathered by c. Procedure consume-and-report (lines 16-23) makes the transition from gotHashes to consumed when the consumer gathers at least B correct blocks and, therefore, the invocation of RS-DEC returns a non-null value. In this case, the consumer consumes the value (line 19) and prepares a report intended to TO (lines 20-23), which is sent by invoking the procedure report (lines [13] [14] [15] . This report contains the vector correcthashvec and the signature of all the producers that already sent correct messages to c, i.e., messages that contained correcthashvec.
Whenever a consumer c receives a Block message from a producer that belongs to missing ∩ prodset c (Alg. 3, line 1), c removes p from missing if the signature is valid (lines 2-3) and, according to its state, performs one of the following actions: i) If c is still in state init, then it stores the received information in the appropriate vectors and invokes minimumHashes (lines [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , in order to verify if it has already gathered a majority of identical vectors of hashes. If that is the case, then c invokes consume-and-report (lines 9-10). ii) If c is in state gotHashes, then it adds the received vector of hashes along with the signature to hashvecs, stores the block, and invokes consume-andreport (lines [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . iii) If c is in state consumed, then it adds the signature of the producer to correctproducers and reports the information received from producers to TO (lines [16] [17] [18] ).
An almost identical approach is followed by c whenever it receives a Summary message, aside from the fact that in this case c does not expect to receive any block (lines 19-33). The trusted observer only waits for Report messages from consumers to include all the received information in the array evidence (lines 3-5). In addition, TO repeatedly tries to produce the evidence about the transfer whenever it receives new information (line 6).
Predicates
We now define the predicates hasProd and hasAck. It is said that producer p is certified by consumer c ∈ conset p iff evidence[c] = h v , report and report[p] = s p (Block, h v ). We say that producer p is certified by consumer c ∈ C\conset p iff evidence[c] = h v , report and report[p] = s p (Summary, h v ). LetP ⊆ P andC ⊆ C be the greatest sets that fulfil the following conditions: i) for each p ∈P and c ∈C, p is certified by c; and ii) for each c ∈C, c invokes consume(c,v).
With this in mind, we now define the predicates as follows:
-For the predicates to be true for any process, #P ≥ N P − F P and #C ≥ N C − F C ; -hasProd(evidence,p) is true iff p ∈P; -hasAck (evidence,c) is true iff c ∈C.
Correctness
In this section, the correctness of the above algorithm is proven in an asynchronous environment, assuming that N P ≥ 2F P + 1, N C ≥ F C + 1, and that all non-Byzantine processes follow the algorithm. In the following two lemmas, we start by showing that the consumers eventually gather enough information to consume the correct value.
Lemma 1. For each non-Byzantine consumer c ∈ C, minimumHashes eventually returns exactly one vector h * = ⊥ and h * = h v . Proof. Every non-Byzantine consumer receives h v from all non-Byzantine producers, eventually. Since N P ≥ 2F P +1, only the vector h v can be sent by F P +1 producers. Therefore, minimumHashes only returns a non-null vector h * if h * = h v and this occurs eventually. Also, when correcthashvec becomes non-null, c never invokes minimumHashes again. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 2. For each consumer c ∈ C, c eventually invokes consume(c,v), and only once.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 1 that, for each non-Byzantine consumer c, correcthashvec is eventually set to h v , and c eventually starts invoking consume-and-report. By the fact that producers send their blocks to all consumers of conset , and by the conditions N P ≥ B+F P and #prodset c = B+F P , c eventually receives B blocks, correct according to h v . Hence, RS-ENC eventually returns v, and only v by the property of non-collision of hash functions. A trivial inspection of the algorithm shows that, once value is set to v = ⊥, c consumes v and never invokes consume-and-report again. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 3. For each non-Byzantine producer p and each non-Byzantine consumer c ∈ conset p , eventually c certifies p.
Proof. According to the algorithm, p always sends a Block message containing its block and s p (Block||h v ) to all c ∈ conset p , whereas p sends a Summary message to all c ∈ C \ conset p , containing s p (Summary||h v ). If c receives this information when it is still in one of the states init and gotHashes, then, by Lemma 2, c eventually sends a report to TO containing this information. If c is already in state consumed, then c immediately sends the report containing this information when it receives the message from p. Either way, c eventually certifies p. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 4. There exist setsP andC of non-Byzantine producers and non-Byzantine consumers, respectively, such that: i) #P ≥ N P − F P and #C ≥ N C − F C ; ii) for each p ∈P and c ∈C, c eventually certifies p; and iii) for each c ∈C, c eventually invokes consume(c,v), where v is the correct value.
Proof. i) follows from the fact that there are N P − F P non-Byzantine producers and N C − F C nonByzantine consumers; ii) follows from Lemma 3; and iii) follows from Lemma 2.
⊓ ⊔
The next theorem concludes the proofs of correctness by showing that each NBART property is fulfilled by the presented algorithm.
Theorem 5. The proposed algorithm solves NBART in an asynchronous environment, assuming that all non-Byzantine processes follow the algorithm.
Proof. The proof is performed individually for each property:
-(Validity): By Lemmas 1 and 2 and by the non-collision property of hash functions, c consumes the correct value, which is produced by all non-Byzantine producers. -(Integrity): Follows from Lemma 2.
-(Agreement): It follows directly from Validity and the fact that all non-Byzantine producers send a block corresponding to the same value. -(Eventual Consumption): Follows from Lemma 2.
-(Evidence): TO invokes certify(evidence) whenever it receives new information, either from producers or consumers. Thus, whenever hasProd(evidence,p) and hasAck (evidence,c) become true for each non-Byzantine producer p and non-Byzantine consumer c respectively, TO invokes certify(evidence). -(Producer and Consumer Certification): Follows from Lemma 4.
⊓ ⊔

Complexity Analysis
The algorithm is evaluated in terms of message and bit complexity. The message complexity is O(N P N C ) due to N C messages sent by each producer that contain the signature of h v . However, since the value may be arbitrarily large, the size of each message may vary significantly, so it is interesting to also evaluate the number of bits exchanged, that is, the bit complexity. For this analysis, let l v , l s , and l h denote the bit length of the value, a signature and an hash. The bit complexity is O(N C (B + F P ) lv B + N P N C (l s + N P l h )). Notice that, if B ≥ O(F P ) and l v ≫ l s , l h , then the bit complexity is O(N C ), which is asymptotically optimal, since there must be at least a value transfer per consumer.
Game Theoretic Analysis
The purpose of this analysis is to show that it is in every Rational process interest to follow the algorithm. We take into consideration some degree of arbitrary collusion.
Definitions
The algorithm is modelled as a coalitional game Γ = (I, T , Σ I , ( t ) t∈T , (u i ) i∈I ):
-I = P ∪ C ∪ {TO} is the set of players.
-T is the set of non-empty subsets of I \ {TO}, which contains all the possible coalitions. Each coalition t ∈ T may contain simultaneously producers and consumers, represented by t P = t ∩ P and t C = t ∩ C, respectively. -Σ I is a set containing all the profile of pure strategies σ I followed by all players of I. Σ t for t ∈ T denotes the set of all collusion strategies the players of t may follow. -t is a preference relation on Σ I × Σ I . We assume that t is transitive and reflexive. We can define the relation of strict preference ≻ t as: for any two profiles of strategies
, then all the players of t will always follow σ * I over σ ′ I . -u i is the utility function of each player i ∈ I, defined as
are the benefits and α i (σ I ) the costs i incurs when players obey σ I .
Sometimes, we will denote the composition of two profiles σ A and σ B as σ A∪B = (σ A , σ B ), where A and B are any two disjoint sets of players. Conversely, u i (σ A , σ B ) is equivalent to u i (σ A∪B ). Each producer p obtains a benefit β P iff hasProd(evidence,p) eventually becomes true, whereas each consumer c obtains a benefit β C iff hasAck (evidence,c) eventually becomes true. It is assumed that for all p ∈ P, β P > α p (σ I ), and for all c ∈ C, β C > α c (σ I ), where σ I is the profile of strategies where all players follow the algorithm.
A coalition t is said to be Rational if the preference relation t fulfils the following condition:
. We assume that the same relation holds, by only replacing ≥ for > and t for ≻ t . It follows that if #t = 1 and the only player i ∈ t is Rational, then for any two profiles of strategies
On the contrary, if #t = 1 and the player i ∈ t is Altruistic, then t is also said to be Altruistic and it is true that (σ t , σ * I\t ) ≻ t (σ * I ) for all σ * I ∈ Σ I and considering that σ I denotes the profile of strategies where all players follow the algorithm. In any other case, t is Byzantine, implying that t is arbitrary due to the Byzantine behaviour of some player from t. It is important to notice that, if t is Byzantine, then all players of t are also considered to be Byzantine, even if some of them have Rational intentions. A coalition t is said to be a producer (t ∈ T P ) if t P = ∅ and it is said to be a consumer (t ∈ T C ) if t C = ∅. The purpose of these definitions is to model scenarios of arbitrary collusion where, for instance, a producer p never executes any local function to produce the value. Instead, it requests the hash of the blocks to other player i, signs this information, and sends it to i. Then, i may transfer the block and the signature of p to all the consumers that expect this information, as if it were sent by p.
For simplicity, we model Byzantine behaviour as a single coalition composed by up to F P + F C players. We consider an arbitrary number of non-Byzantine coalitions, as long as each coalition is never composed by more than N P T producers and N C T consumers. The distinction between producers and consumers will allow us a more refined analysis of the bounds on the minimum number of producers and consumers. If we only considered a single parameter, the bounds would be stricter than necessary. As it will be shown later, we now require the following conditions to hold for the algorithm to be tolerant to collusion: N P ≥ max(F P , N P T ) + F P + 1 and N C ≥ F C + N C T + 1.
Expected Utility and Solution Concept
We use the notion of Byzantine-aware utility function for risk-averse players introduced in [11] . An improvement of this work for models where players may be risk-seekers is left for future work. Let F P and F C denote the set of Byzantine producers and consumers, respectively, and let π P ∈ Π P and π C ∈ Π C be the corresponding profiles of strategies. Let us denote by σ I\F ,π C ,π C the profile of strategies where all non-Byzantine players follow the strategy specified by σ I , Byzantine producers follow the strategies of π P and Byzantine consumers obey the strategies of π C . The expected utility of each player i ∈ I \ F is defined as follows:
Recall that, since we consider communication costs, a solution concept as strong as (k, t)-robustness is impossible in our case. To overcome this impossibility result, we use the concept of k-resilience combined with the Byzantine aware utility function defined above. However, we still cannot ensure that no player from a coalition t can increase its utility regardless of whether some other player obtains a lower utility or not. What we intend to show is that, regardless of the preferred collusion strategy of each coalition, the chosen strategies fulfil the NBART properties.
In order to formalise this intuition, we define the observable behaviour of each coalition t ∈ T for the profile of strategies σ t as a multi-set of events triggered in each player i ∈ I \ t that are influenced by σ t , which we denote by φ i (σ t ). For any player i ∈ I \ t, the delivery of a message sent by some player j ∈ t is an event. In addition, there are two events triggered in TO, namely produce(p,v) for each p ∈ t P and consume(c,v) for each c ∈ t C . Henceforth, the meaning of a producer producing a value or a consumer consuming a value is that the corresponding event is eventually triggered in TO.
We say that collusion profile σ * t ∈ Σ t is compliant with the profile
The set of profiles of strategies compliant with σ I is denoted by Σ t (σ I ), where σ t ∈ Σ t (σ I ). The solution concept we use in this work, named n collusion tolerance (n-cotolerance), is similar to the concept of k-resilience, aside from the fact that we do not require that players in collusion follow the algorithm exactly; only that they follow a profile of strategies from Σ t (σ I ). More precisely: Definition 6. For any n ∈ N, a profile of strategies σ I is n-cotolerant iff for all t ∈ T such that #t ≤ n, for all σ * t ∈ Σ t (σ I ) such that (σ * t , σ I\t ) t σ I , and for all
The above definition is generic and may be of independent interest. In order to apply it to the NBART problem, we additionally need to capture the distinction between producers and consumers. Therefore, we introduce two parameters x, y ∈ N, that establish the limit on the number of producers and consumers within the coalition respectively, such that n ≥ x, y and n ≤ x + y. With this definition, if n = 1, then there is no collusion among non-Byzantine players. Henceforth, we will say that a profile of strategies σ I is (n, x, y)-cotolerant iff it is n-cotolerant, n ≥ x, y and n ≤ x + y, and for all t ∈ T #t P ≤ x and #t C ≤ y.
Tolerance to Collusion
The purpose of this section is twofold: i) show that, considering that σ I denotes the profile of strategies where all players follow the algorithm, for any combination of Byzantine and Rational collusions, and any coalition t, if all players of t follow a profile of strategies from Σ t (σ I ), then the NBART properties are fulfilled; and ii) show that any profile of strategies σ * t ∈ Σ t is preferable to σ t only if σ * t ∈ Σ t (σ I ). The proofs of this section rely on the assumption that N P ≥ max(F P , N P T ) + F P + 1 and N C ≥ F C + N C T + 1.
We find it useful to identify the following corollary that states that in any coalition t, produce(p,v) must be invoked for all p ∈ t P , which follows from the fact that produce (p, v) ∈ φ TO (σ t ).
Corollary 7. For any t ∈ T P , if t follows a profile of strategies from Σ t (σ I ), then for each p ∈ t P , p invokes produce(p, v).
Let ǫ : Σ t → E N C be a function that for each profile σ * I returns an instance of the data structure evidence ∈ E N C stored by TO when it produces evidence about the transfer, by replacing any entrance corresponding to a Byzantine player by the value ⊥, i.e., if c ∈ F C and e = ǫ(σ * I ), then e[c] = ⊥, and if p ∈ F P , then e[c][p] = ⊥ for all c ∈ C \ F C .
We state the following proposition that ǫ depends only on the observable behaviour of each player:
Proposition 8. For any t ∈ T and for any profile σ * I ∈ Σ I , if φ TO (σ * I ) = φ TO (σ I ), then ǫ(σ * I ) = ǫ(σ I ). We show in the following theorem that if each coalition t follows a strategy from Σ t (σ * t ), then the algorithm tolerates collusion. Fix any arbitrary f ∈ F such that #f P ≤ F P and #f C ≤ F C . By assumption, N P ≥ max(F P , N P T ) + F P + 1 and N C ≥ F C + N C T + 1, and let l denote an arbitrary partition of I \ ({TO} ∪ f ) such that, for any t ∈ l, #t P ≤ N P T and #t C ≤ N C T . We use the notation #(e, m) to denote the frequency of element e in the multi-set m.
Theorem 9. For some arbitrary partition l, and for any σ * I = ((σ * t ) t∈l,σ * t ∈Σt(σ I ) , (π p ) p∈f P , (π c ) c∈f C ), if all players follow σ * I , then the NBART properties are fulfilled.
Proof. Notice that, in this scenario, it is also true that: 1) N P ≥ 2F P + 1 and 2) N C ≥ F C + 1. Let us fix some arbitrary t ∈ T C ∩ l and c ∈ t C . The correctness is proved for each of the NBART properties:
-(Validity): consume(c,v) ∈ φ TO (σ * t ), where v must be a value for which there are F P + 1 signatures of h v , otherwise φ TO (σ * I ) = φ TO (σ I ) and σ * t / ∈ Σ t (σ I ). By 1) and Corollary 7, there is only one value that fulfils these restrictions, which is the value produced by all nonByzantine producers.
-(Integrity): Since the players of t follow σ * t and σ * t ∈ Σ t (σ I ), #(consume(c, v), φ TO (σ * t )) = 1. -(Agreement): It follows directly from Validity and Corollary 7.
-(Eventual Consumption): Since φ c (σ * I ) = φ c (σ I ), t receives blocks from all the non-Byzantine producers from prodset c \ t P . If #(prodset c \ t P ) ≥ F P + B, then c eventually gathers B blocks corresponding to the correct value, otherwise, #t P ≥ 1 and by Corollary 7 some producer of t produces the value. In either case, by the definition of Σ t (σ I ), c must invoke consume(c,v).
-(Evidence): It follows from the fact that TO is Altruistic.
-(Producer and Consumer Certification): By the definition of Σ t (σ * t ), φ TO (σ * I ) = φ TO (σ I ). By Theorem 5 and by 1) and 2), if all players follow σ I , then the properties NBART 6-7 are fulfilled for e = ǫ(σ I ). It follows from Proposition 8 that ǫ(σ * I ) = e. Since the value of the predicates only depends on e, then these properties also hold in this new scenario.
⊓ ⊔
We now provide the proofs that the profile of strategies σ I where all players follow the algorithm is (N P T + N C T , N P T , N C T )-cotolerant for N P ≥ max(F P , N P T ) + F P + 1 and N C ≥ F C + N C T + 1. The following two lemmas show that, for each t ∈ T the expected benefit is 0 for all i ∈ t, whenever players of t follow a profile of strategies from Σ t \ Σ t (σ I ). Recall that we assume that the players are risk averse. Therefore, the analysis is done assuming worst case Byzantine behaviour.
